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CHRISTOPHER LEDFORD*
Comment
The Dream that Never Dies: Eldred
v. Ashcroft , the Author, and the
Search for Perpetual Copyright
[O]ne is a writer as Louis XIV was king, even on the
commode.1
—Roland Barthes
In 1998, Mary Bono, congresswoman and widow of singer/ac-tor/congressman Sonny Bono, implored her colleagues to
adopt the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) that bore her
departed husband’s name and ideological imprimatur.2  Mrs.
Bono reported that Mr. Bono had “wanted the term of copyright
protection to last forever,”3 though the CTEA’s drafters mod-
estly aspired to add only twenty years to the then-existing term of
the author’s life plus fifty years.4  The additional term provided
virtually no additional incentive to authors, diminished the public
domain, and was not rationally related to the progress of creative
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2006; Articles Editor, Ore-
gon Law Review , 2005-06. The author would like to thank Professor Keith Aoki,
Alex Thayer, Ben Clark, Sydney Ledford, and Jason Robison for their assistance.
1 ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 30 (Annette Lavers trans., Hill & Wang
1972) (1957).
2 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
3 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono).
Congresswoman Bono was advised by staffers that her husband’s desire was uncon-
stitutional.  Accordingly, she suggested that the proposal of Jack Valenti, then head
of the MPAA, for copyright duration of “forever less one day” should be considered
during the next Congress. Id.  § 102 at H9952.
4 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102.  The CTEA also added
twenty years to the work-for-hire term.
[655]
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expression, yet the Supreme Court validated the extension in El-
dred v. Ashcroft  despite the CTEA’s dubious utility and
constitutionality.5
The Court’s actions were unfortunate but predictable.  Such
foresight merely required looking backwards to the “author’s”
persistent prominence in legal and social discourse.6  The exces-
sive focus on the author resulted in the Court using a fundamen-
tally flawed calculus to assess the rationality of the monopoly
grant accorded to the producers of copyrighted material in ex-
change for their creative output.
Flawed, yes; novel, no, nor accidental.  Media interests,
whether early-eighteenth century London publishers or twenty-
first century multinational conglomerates, have used authors
both as the source of property and as a means to further protect
that property once acquired, sublimating their own interests into
pleas for the authors’. The resulting system of copyright protec-
tion pays tribute to authors yet accords them minimal benefits,
restricts the public’s access and use of creative expression, and
funnels money and power to media corporations in amounts that
are both enormous and disproportionate to the corporations’ im-
portance in disseminating expression.
Absent the Copyright Clause’s dictates, mere iniquity proves
nothing.  However, the purpose of the constitutional language is
clear: the promotion of learning, for which limited copyright du-
ration is essential.7  The Court’s willingness in Eldred  to accept
the proposition that “[w]hether 50 years is enough, or 70 years
too much . . . is not a judgment meet for this Court”8 is troubling
when considering two further questions: Are future increases in
5 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
6 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author? , in  THE FOUCAULT READER 101,
108-09 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984); see also BARTHES, supra  note 1, at 29-31.  The
seminal work relating the “author effect” to copyright law is Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship” , 41 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991).
For a critique of the Romantic vision of copyright law, see Mark A. Lemley, Roman-
tic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property , 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997).  Lemley
asserts that “Romantic authorship can be viewed in two ways – as an argument that
is used in intellectual property cases, or as a broader explanation for the law of
information.” Id.  at 878.  He is primarily concerned with the latter.  Yet, while he
makes several excellent points about an overly facile reading of the “author effect,”
there seems to be substantial overlap between the two views.
7 See  L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791:  An Essay Concerning
the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution , 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 938 (2003).
8 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 193 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 14).
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copyright duration likely to be sought and if so, what are their
chances of passing constitutional muster?
Alone, the CTEA is merely a lamentable manifestation of con-
gressional overzealousness when a major source of revenue is
slipping away from U.S. businesses.  However, taken in the con-
text of a continuing struggle by powerful media corporations to
obtain perpetual copyright protection, it is evidence that the de-
sire for perpetual protection, which has persisted for centuries,
remains active.  Therefore, judicial intervention is all the more
necessary if a future Congress exceeds its mandate.  One almost
certainly will.  After all, if twenty extra years provide a substan-
tial increase in the revenues from copyrighted material, why not
forty?  Why not forever less one day?  One obvious answer is
that such increases would be unconstitutional.  Yet, this ought to
provide little comfort given the CTEA’s own status as merely a
lesser (though ignored by the Court) violation of the Copyright
Clause.9  If, as in Eldred , the needs of the author mask the inter-
ests of those seeking to further extend copyright protection, the
necessary intervention will not occur.
This Comment therefore attempts three things.  First, to show
that the history of copyright is replete with the use of the author
to further the interests of the major media powers.  Second, to
show that this history demonstrates that the CTEA springs from
a property rights ideology shared by centuries of publishers,
making further attempts to increase copyright protections as
clear a predictive certainty as is possible.  Third, to unpack the
“author” rhetoric in Eldred  (and, to the extent that it exists, in
the CTEA) and by so doing, appropriately situate the author in




Critiquing extended copyright terms, and specifically the legiti-
mating role of the author in those extensions, necessarily as-
sumes two things: that “the author” is a useful concept for
9 Congress may be increasingly ignoring constitutional limitations when drafting
statutes and simply assuming that the Supreme Court will fix any problems. See
Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit:  How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-
Congress Crusade , 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001); Suzanna Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds
Contempt , 6 GREEN BAG 2D 47 (2002).
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describing the ways in which people think about the source of
creative expression, and that perpetual (or merely the further ex-
tension of) copyright duration should be avoided.
A. The Ongoing Role of the Author in Copyright Law
The evolution of the “author” as a specially valorized individ-
ual occurred as part of an effort by eighteenth century writers to
ensure their livelihood by asserting the unique value derived
from their contributions.10  Before the rise of the Romantic au-
thor, the efforts of writers were already regarded as valuable, and
authorship “had positive connotations as a designation for liter-
ary activity of special merit.”11  However, the Romantic author
was more than the producer of the book’s text, one member of
the team consisting of “the papermaker, the type founder, the
typesetter and the printer, the proofreader, the publisher, the
book binder, sometimes even the gilder and the brass-worker,
etc.”12  The new author was not a member of the team; she stood
outside, creating from within herself.  This “coming into being of
the notion of ‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of indi-
vidualization  in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, phi-
losophy, and the sciences.”13
The role of the author in the development of copyright law, for
profit or ill (or nil), has been debated extensively over the last
fifteen years.14  Much of the current debate centers not on the
existence of the Romantic vision, but on the degree to which it
10 See  Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:  Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’ , 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425,
426 (1984).
11 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect:  Contemporary Copyright and Collective Cre-
ativity , in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:  TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW
AND LITERATURE 29, 32 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) [hereinafter
Copyright]; see also  John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright:  The Recog-
nition of Authors’ Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries , in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:  TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 191 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi
eds., 1994).
12 Woodmansee, supra  note 10, at 425 (quoting and translating GEORG HEINRICH
ZINCK, ALLGEMEINES OECONOMISCHES LEXICON, col. 442 (Leipzig, 1753)).
13 FOUCAULT, supra  note 6, at 101.
14 Compare  Jaszi, supra  note 6 (discussing the constantly shifting nature of the
author in copyright law), with  Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Immi-
nent Decline in Authorial Control Over Copyrighted Works,  42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
93, 107 (1994) (asserting that the author effect is not nearly so great a motive force
in copyright law as some assert), and  Lemley, supra  note 6 (distinguishing between
different types of effects of the author construct).
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has affected and continues to affect legislative and judicial deci-
sion-making.  Discerning the Romantic author’s importance is
made more difficult by the fact that while the paradigm of the
genius in the garret is easily attacked as having little purchase on
reality, a subtler, almost pre-Romantic notion of authorship sur-
vives.  That notion abandons the strict doctrines of the pure Ro-
mantic author.  Yet, it carries the coloring of entitlement to
rewards solely because the expression is a commodification of
the self.  This faded specificity has enabled the author’s use to
buttress a multitude of different—and often contradictory—poli-
cies, such as its use to support moral rights and increased copy-
right duration.  This flexibility of meaning thus serves to both
obfuscate and solidify the author’s cultural power.
Yet, despite its legitimating role in increasing copyright protec-
tion, as Peter Jaszi has observed, viewing the author as merely “a
stalking horse for economic interests . . . better concealed than
revealed” assumes too much.15  Instead, Jaszi suggests that the
Romantic conception of authorship stands in permanent tension
with the media interests’ desire for complete alienability of prop-
erty;16 between the two lies the truth.
The actuality is one of continually shifting and overlapping ge-
ographies of interest: author, publisher, and public all striving to
maximize their position, never governing the path of cultural
forces and ideological trends, but making the best of each new
development.  And on this mutable terrain, media interests have
been ceaselessly adept at advancing their own agenda, usually
through language emphasizing the importance of incentives for
both authors’ production and their own dissemination of the au-
thors’ work.  Granting authors a significant level of copyright
protection to reward past and encourage future production is at
minimum a constitutionally sound notion.  Yet, this deserving
status often clouds the judgment of those who determine appro-
priate copyright protection and can serve to disrupt, to the detri-
ment of the public, the proper balancing of incentives.
Indeed, the absolute and omnipotent manipulation of authors
and the concept of authorship by a continuing media cabal are
not argued.  No such plan presents itself, even in hindsight.  Ulte-
rior motives by media interests should not be taken to mean that
authors passively allow the facile manipulation of sentiment in
15 Jaszi, supra  note 6, at 500.
16 Id.  at 501-02.
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the media interests’ favor. Increased property rights are clearly
not inimical to authors, as any benefit has the potential to flow to
them.  More importantly than any economic rationale, casting
authors as geniuses and guileless dupes all at once rings hollow as
a workable paradigm. Yet even if one accepts for the moment
that authors deserve something like perpetual copyright protec-
tion, they invariably receive the lesser share of the benefits.
When authors’ and media corporations’ interests diverge and one
group’s position must yield,17 even on the rare occasion when the
latter does not triumph, the media corporations’ interests are
hardly dampened.  Ultimately, the moments of authorial
supremacy serve mainly to illustrate the manner in which per-
ceived advances by authors are deflected or minimized while the
media interests acquire and retain tremendous benefits through
their association with authors.
Media interests have always enjoyed the structural advantage
of size and the corresponding actuarial ability to view every work
as part of a larger group of potential, but not definite, sources of
revenue.  Yet, the asymmetric symbiosis between the two groups
is more apparent today than ever before, a phenomenon result-
ing primarily from the prevalence of works-for-hire and the natu-
ral concentration of ownership of the rights to such works.
Greater consolidation of media corporations is also a concern, as
is the potential impact this centralized ownership and control
could have over creative expression.18  These circumstances dic-
tate the need for a proper accounting of copyright protection and
an assessment of the true role of the author in securing that
protection.
B. Perpetual Copyright
Authorship’s fluid meaning is amply illustrated by the argu-
ments surrounding this Comment’s second assertion: perpetual
(or extended) copyright is undesirable.  The primary reason un-
derlying this assertion is the adverse effect on the public do-
main—the commons of unprotected expression that all may draw
17 See, e.g. , Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).  However, while the rights of
the author took precedence over those of the transferee, this case merely reached a
favorable result by construing a statute already replaced with one that effectively
nullified the result of the case.
18 This trend has been met with growing resistance. See  Prometheus Radio Project
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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upon in the creation of new works—caused by greater copyright
duration.
Those favoring an extended term include the “neoclassicists,”19
who assert that the market achieves the most efficient allocation
of goods and to this end desire increased propertization.  To this
group, the public domain is merely a different expression for the
tragedy of the commons.  Yet, “author’s rights” language can be
indirectly used to further the neoclassicist goal of greater dura-
tion and alienability.  Initially, authors are asserted to have a pro-
prietary interest in their work that justifies a legal relationship
distinct from that used for other forms of property.  Once the
distinct relationship is accepted, the knot between the author and
the work need only be loosened, leaving the conception of copy-
righted material as properly held in a monopoly grant, but with-
out the ongoing interest of the author.
The overlap between authors’ rights and the neoclassicists’ ef-
forts is especially interesting because they are so logically and
ideologically incompatible.  Granting authors real rights in their
creations means adopting a regime similar to that in Europe,
where authors permanently retain certain rights in their copy-
righted work.20  Conversely, the neoclassicist would cut the tie
between the work and the author much as the car is taken from
the manufacturer—with no future interest at all.  Tension
emerges occasionally, such as when “authors’ rights” birthed the
Moral Rights movement, but the author concept is sufficiently
malleable to support both authors’ rights and neoclassicist goals.
This strange alliance illuminates the difficulty of determining
the proper length of copyright protection without a clear articula-
tion of the likely effects of the policy proposals put forth under
one ideological banner or another.  Perhaps the neoclassicists
have it right—though this is highly unlikely for reasons that will
become apparent—yet advancing their interests under the wing
of authorship does a disservice to any actual debate about the
matter.
19 “Neoclassicist” is a term used by Neil Netanel in his article Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society , 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996), and one that I adopt for pur-
poses of this Comment as being both accurate and more elegant than “law and eco-
nomics view.” See id.  at 312.
20 For a general discussion of authors’ rights under the Berne Convention, see
Stephen Fraser, Berne, CFTA, NAFTA, & GATT:  The Implications of Copyright
Droit Moral and Cultural Exemptions in International Trade Law , 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 287, 290-97 (1996).
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The importance of the public domain, and by extension the
argument against increased copyright duration, is perhaps most
vividly illustrated by granting the neoclassicists their desire and
examining the results.  With the increased duration, less material
is freely available to others for use in their work because the ma-
terial is subject to copyright.  If the material is necessary to the
new work, potential users must bargain with the owner.  How-
ever, predictive valuation of any nonexistent (or often, existent)
piece of expression is overwhelmingly difficult, making reasona-
bly informed bargaining by either side nearly impossible because
there is almost no way to adequately gauge the value of such
expression.  The effect is obvious: increased propertization is less
likely to foster further production of expression.21  This is the
fundamental problem with the extended duration: those in con-
trol of already existing expression (i.e., large corporations) are
temperamentally disposed—and perhaps rightly so in a system
with a less vigorous public domain—toward exploiting already
created properties rather than developing new works.
Given the vital role of past expression in the creation of new,
the increased propertization model is akin to building the second
floor by removing and using, piece by piece, the materials com-
prising the first floor.  Without the public domain—the first
floor—there is nothing to build on.22  In a sense, this is the ulti-
mate, perverse expression of Romantic authorship, as it assumes
that creation can be traced back to a single source, and that all
further creation should either pay the originator or create the
world anew.
The willingness to brook the harm caused by extended copy-
right duration may be partly due to the softening effects that
other elements of the copyright scheme have on any potential
injury.23  The idea/expression division is one significant example
of how a copyright doctrine’s inherent subjectivity and adaptabil-
21 Under the neoclassical doctrine, incentives for creation are less important than
securing a functioning market that will theoretically serve to properly allocate all
resources. See Netanel, supra  note 19, at 309-10.
22 Some have noted that the “Romance of the Public Domain” serves to obscure
the distributional iniquities of the public domain when considering intellectual en-
deavors such as traditional and folk knowledge. See  Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain , 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004).  This is
merely another example of the problem with overemphasizing the author when
measuring appropriate copyright.
23 For example, the neoclassicists offer fair use as a solution for market failure in a
totally propertized world.  For a discussion of fair use and market failure, see Wendy
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ity of application serves as a safety valve when new creative work
is put under the pressure of history.24  As a statement about the
interconnectedness of copyright law, this buffering effect cap-
tures some of the dynamics at play.  For example, modifying du-
ration can cure the harm that other copyright doctrines cause by
removing the protections from the expression after a limited pe-
riod of time.
However, simply because other protections exist does not
mean that any one of them is disposable.  Overemphasizing the
importance of the author and increasing copyright duration
reduces the public domain, without which the actual work of cre-
ation cannot normally occur. Furthermore, doctrines such as fair
use and the idea/expression dichotomy are merely outgrowths of
the public domain and allow the normal transmutive, creative
function to occur without the fear of sanction.25
The rioting forth of scholarship and artistry that has occurred
during ever-increasing copyright duration gives one pause when
questioning the wisdom of greater duration.  Yet, the CTEA and
Eldred  demonstrate that the distorting role of the author and the
desire for perpetual copyright remain strong.  If those tendencies
are to be counteracted, the true interests of all parties affected
and the need to maintain a vibrant public domain must be moved
to the fore.  This can only occur when the CTEA and Eldred  are
placed in historical context as the latest chapter in a long line of
similar efforts and analyzed accordingly.
J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors , 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1631 (1982).
24 See, e.g. , Judge Hand’s application of the idea/expression dichotomy in Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp. , 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (elucidating the “abstrac-
tion test”).  Another example is fair use. See, e.g. , Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Camp-
bell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing the Roy Orbison song “Pretty Woman”
to be parodied by 2 Live Crew).  For an example of the parody defense failing to
provide a safe haven, see Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates , 581 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1978) (finding infringement for the use of Mickey in a sordid counter-culture
role).
25 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain , 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990).  There are
some strong and valid critiques of the “Romance of the Public Domain” as enabling
the transfer of traditional and folk knowledge to countries that then produce copy-
rightable material based upon that knowledge. See  Chander & Sunder, supra  note
22.  However, as this is a critique of both the unequal power relationships between
postindustrial and still-industrializing economies and the overemphasis on authors as
the baseline for determining validity of copyright ownership, it is partially within and
partially beyond the scope of this Comment.  Accordingly, the public domain is
herein assumed to be a positive and necessary concept, yet is not presumed to be a
panacea for all ills.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE206.txt unknown Seq: 10 28-NOV-05 13:21
664 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
II
THE RISE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The CTEA and Eldred  are twinned across the centuries by the
English booksellers’ efforts to secure perpetual copyright.  Com-
parison of the two time periods, as with any other historical anal-
ogy, offers few explicit points—the rub of particular contexts
inevitably dulls down any knowledge extracted from the juxtapo-
sition.  Nevertheless, a blunt lesson emerges about the manner in
which concentrated, powerful media interests push authors to the
forefront when discussing appropriate duration, producing a
transient emotional effect that masks their own distinct aim:
lengthier copyright protection.  Lost in the push is an adequate
examination of the primary question, namely, what duration will
maximize the constitutionally mandated goal of promoting crea-
tive expression?  Backgrounded by the early struggles over copy-
right’s proper role and extent, the CTEA and Eldred  appear for
what they are: the latest iterations of a long-fought struggle.
Awareness of their contextualized significance is therefore vital
for an accurate assessment of their role in the copyright regime’s
development.
At the turn of the seventeenth century, London book publish-
ers, the major media interest of the day, struggled to protect their
fading privileges.  In 1556, they were granted a charter to form
the Stationers’ Company.  That charter included powers to regu-
late unlawful publishing, which gave the publishers what
amounted to a protocopyright.26  Rights in works vested com-
pletely in the publisher and were both freely alienable and per-
petual27—in short, empyrean bliss for the publishers.  Their
apogee of power came in 1662 with the passage of the Licensing
Act, which was widely and accurately perceived as a vehicle for
monopoly and state censorship.28  Discontent with the Act led to
Parliament allowing it to lapse in 1694,29 leaving the publishing
business open to both piracy and a surfeit of competition.  Sym-
pathy for the publishers’ loss of privileges did not run high; some
other rationale was needed to justify reacquiring their monopoly.
An even greater obstacle was the joinder of copyright and cen-
sorship in the minds of those who had experienced the Licensing
26 Patterson & Joyce, supra  note 7, at 913.
27 Id.  at 913-14.
28 Id.  at 919.
29 Id.  at 916.
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Act’s injustices.  Unless some way to sever the two could be
found, Parliament was likely to rebuff the publishers’ efforts to
substitute new restrictions on printing for those lost when the Li-
censing Act expired.30
Shifting copyright rhetoric away from a discussion of publish-
ers’ rights and censorship to focus on the rights of the producers
was that way.  The shift was not always subtle or complete.  Com-
paring the copyright statute ultimately passed by Parliament with
earlier alternatives put forth reveals the interests that were sub-
merged in the author-centric rhetoric and points to the author’s
use in justifying perpetual copyright that has persisted through
the CTEA and Eldred .  Most striking is the provision in the stat-
ute’s early version that would have given authors an ongoing in-
terest in their work as opposed to simply being paid a lump sum
and sent back to the creative coal mine for more product.31  The
text of the statute was altered to remove language giving an au-
thor the right to “reserve to himself” the rights to a work, thus
preventing the results from conforming too  closely to the
rhetoric.32
Authors proved a sympathetic group, effectively drawing the
debate away from the statute’s relation to monopolies and cen-
sorship and toward the vision of public-spirited furtherance of
knowledge.33  Thus, when Parliament passed the Statute of
Anne—the first true copyright legislation—in 1710, the stated
purpose was “for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Com-
pose and Write useful Books.”34  The evil sought to be avoided
was the practice of “Printing, Reprinting, and Publishing . . .
Books, and other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors
or Proprietors of such Books and Writings, to their very great
Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Fami-
lies.”35  These are the same professed concerns that resonate
through the CTEA and Eldred .
The Statute’s goals were threefold: first, to encourage learning;
second, to ensure public access to knowledge; and third, to en-
30 John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of
1710 , 8 PUBLISHING HIST. 19 (1980).
31 Id.  at 36.
32 Id.  at 35-36.
33 Id.  at 31.
34 Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19
(Eng.).
35 Id.
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hance the public domain.36  All three were furthered by the Stat-
ute’s copyright terms of twenty-one years for existing works and
fourteen years, once renewable, for new works.37  These terms
ensured incentives for producing new works by granting a limited
monopoly but removed that protection relatively quickly, send-
ing the works into the public domain.  John Feather’s description
of the Statute of Anne’s mixed results is especially prescient and,
by modifying an uncomfortably small number of words, might
describe the status of copyright today:
With their internal machinery of oligarchic control . . . their
monopoly of distribution through the wholesaling congers, the
control of production by a few wealthy capitalists, and the ex-
clusive trade sales to ensure that no copies fell into the wrong
hands, they were already safe enough; but to all this was now
added the majesty of the law, protecting them without involv-
ing them in the delicate and unpopular area of censorship. The
1710 Act may have encouraged learning: that is rather difficult
to quantify. In the long term, it even provided a spring-board
from which professional authors could assert their power. But
its most immediate effect was that it ensured the continued
dominance of English publishing by a few London firms, and
their continued and ever increasing prosperity.38
Thus, submerged within its author-centered language was the
primary motive force behind the Statute of Anne: securing the
publishing monopoly lost when the Licensing Act lapsed.39  The
abortive elision of publisher control thus ended, but not without
far reaching consequences.  Foremost was the new copyright’s
use “to create a stable legal foundation for a market in texts as
commodities.”40  By the middle of the century, authors were in-
creasingly independent of the patronage system,41 opening the
field to authors who appealed to less constrained tastes.
Additionally, although the Statute of Anne occurred before
the rise of the Romantic notion of the author, the publishers’
efforts to place the author at the fore were an indirect force be-
hind the rise of that ideal, as the “laws which regulate . . . writing
36 Patterson & Joyce, supra  note 7, at 918.
37 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
38 Feather, supra  note 30, at 37.
39 Id.  at 20.  The use of the author as a tool of repression also occurred in France.
Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolu-
tionary France, 1777-1793 , 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109, 111-12 (1990).
40 Copyright , supra  note 11, at 32.
41 Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy
of Modern Authorship , 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 54 (1988).
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practices” served to legitimize and reinforce the author-as-
source-of-original-material creative model.42
The drive to enact the Statute of Anne demonstrates how the
overlapping interests of authors, publishers, and the public may
all benefit under certain copyright regimes, even if the benefit is
not balanced equally.  The process that gave rise to the Statute,
although driven by the publishers’ desire to assure themselves a
sinecure from perpetual copyright, also gave rise to tangible ben-
efits for authors and the public.
Yet, while the Statute of Anne assured the publishers some
security and prosperity, it did not give them the permanent mo-
nopoly that they desired.  Therefore, the decades following the
Statute’s enactment found the publishers attempting to have leg-
islation passed that would provide for copyright protection “for a
longer term of years, or for life.”43  The situation became espe-
cially dire as 1731, the date on which the first copyrights secured
by the Statute of Anne began entering the public domain, came
and went.  Attempts to obtain additional copyright protection
failed in 1735, 1738, and 1739;44 wealthy publishers struggling to
regain the franchise that had both served as an engine of repres-
sion and simultaneously brought them great wealth and power
did not constitute a terribly congenial cause.
Having failed to obtain a legislative solution, the publishers at-
tempted a judicial one.  Predictably, they again used the author
as a vehicle to demand rights for themselves.  Beginning in 1731,
and culminating in the cases Millar v. Taylor45 and Donaldson v.
Beckett46 (which litigated the rights to publish the works of the
author James Thomson), publishers argued that copyright prop-
erly was a natural right of the author (freely assignable, of
course) that existed independently of any statute.47  The exalta-
42 Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity , in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:  TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERA-
TURE 15 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); see also  Rose, supra  note
41, at 54 (“[C]opyright . . . not only makes possible the profitable publishing of
books but also, by endowing it with legal reality, produces and affirms the very iden-
tity of the author as author.”).
43 Donaldson v. Becket, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774), 991-92 (De Grey, Lord Chief
Justice).
44 Patterson & Joyce, supra  note 7, at 923.
45 Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
46 Donaldson v. Becket, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.).
47 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 7 at 925-27.  For a discussion of the logic of self-
ownership, see J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 188-97 (1996).
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tion of authors and the natural law copyright supposedly vesting
in them thinly and unpersuasively masked the publishers’ inten-
tion “to benefit themselves, not the author, by having the author
assign the copyright to them forever.”48  Although the publishers
persuaded the Millar  court to recognize a common law copy-
right,49 the House of Lords was unsympathetic to the publishers’
ahistorical argument for common law copyright and refused to
grant an extra-statutory, perpetual copyright in Donaldson .50
When the United States faced the problem of setting copyright
protection, the drafters of the Constitution and the Copyright
Act of 1790 were well aware of the Statute of Anne and its ante-
cedents.  Therefore, they recognized that although the promotion
of learning justified copyright’s monopoly grant, such a scheme
was more regulatory than proprietary.  Furthermore, the limited
grant’s ability to cure defects in the awarding of the monopoly
was too important to give a perpetual copyright.51  Nevertheless,
a predictable attempt to circumvent the statutory scheme by as-
serting a common law copyright occurred in the 1834 case Whea-
ton v. Peters .52  However, the attempt met with an identical fate
to Donaldson , and the Supreme Court refused to judicially rec-
ognize what the legislature had denied.53
Another illuminating early example of the dissonance between
publishers’ desires and true authors’ rights is found in the period
immediately preceding the passage of the English Copyright Act
of 1842.  The push for increased duration in the extant copyright
statute occurred near the height of Romanticism.  The originally
proposed extension strove to maximize the benefit to authors’
families by extending the term to life plus sixty years.54  The ven-
eration of the authors’ efforts and the need for special reward is
48 Patterson & Joyce, supra  note 7, at 925.
49 Millar , 98 Eng. Rep. 201.
50 Donaldson , 98 Eng. Rep. 257.
51 Patterson & Joyce, supra  note 7, at 939, 945-46. The Copyright Act of 1831 had
already extended copyright duration, in no small part due to the ministrations of
Noah Webster, who traveled to Washington D.C. in 1830 to lobby for greater copy-
right protection.  Webster’s efforts were validated by the passage of the 1831 Act.
Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology , 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37, 38-
39 (2002).
52 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
53 Id.
54 John Feather, Publishers and Politicians:  The Remaking of the Law of Copy-
right in Britain 1775-1842 Part II:  The Rights of Authors , 25 PUBLISHING HIST. 45, 47
(1989).
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best expressed by Wordsworth’s 1838 poem urging greater copy-
right, “A Plea for Authors”:
Failing impartial measure to dispense
To every suitor, Equity is lame;
And social Justice, stript of reverence
For natural rights, a mockery and a shame;
Law but a servile dupe of false pretence,
If, guarding grossest things from common claim
Now and for ever, She, to works that came
From mind and spirit, grudge a short-lived fence.
‘What! lengthened privilege, a lineal tie,
For Books!’ Yes, heartless Ones, or be it proved
That ’tis a fault in Us to have lived and loved
Like others, with like temporal hopes to die;
No public harm that Genius from her course
Be turned; and streams of truth dried up, even at their
source!55
However, for once the publishers were against the increase.
They feared having to pay excessive amounts to authors who
would have little chance of succeeding to posterity in the manner
of Wordsworth or Scott or Coleridge, yet would expect more
compensation for signing away the rights which, theoretically at
least, had greater earning potential than before.  This interlude in
the publishers’ search for greater copyright protection illustrates
two important points.  First, the publishers’ desire for a lengthier
term does not stand outside economics.  If it ceases to be a profit-
able pursuit, or rather if it appears to cease being so, the quest is
abandoned.  The second and related point is that the moment
authors’ rights no longer coincide with their agenda, media inter-
ests are immediately willing to drop the authors’ rights language.
Neither point is surprising, but each bears attention, as they rein-
force the author concept’s status as a historical artifact that is
subject to the pressures of the moment, whatever its resilience as
a cultural construct.
Immediately apparent when comparing early copyright law
with the CTEA and Eldred  is the publishers’ long-standing de-
sire for perpetual copyright—to conform intellectual property
55 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, A Plea for Authors , in WORDSWORTH: POETICAL
WORKS 222, 222-23 (1967).
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law to a functional identity with other forms of property.56  The
methods that the publishers employed in their push for complete
alienability also demonstrate the extent to which they were able
to utilize an emerging conception of the author to their own ad-
vantage.  Total control of the process or the results of their ideo-
logical sleight of hand never existed.  Significant benefits did flow
to authors and the public, yet the structure of copyright laws and
market practices assured that the publishers reigned supreme.
Despite the intervening three centuries between the Statute of
Anne and the CTEA, the motivating ideology of the media cor-
porations remains largely focused on expanding property rights.
The ideological battles fought over the nature of copyright dura-
tion in eighteenth and nineteenth century England and the
United States possess more than just historical significance.  They
prefigure the struggle playing out today.  The use of the author as
a sympathetic—and often complicit—figure in the service of real-
izing that goal remains unchanged.
III
THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT AND
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
The desire for perpetual copyright and the continued use of
the author to subvert proper accounting of perpetual copyrights’
benefits and detriments are evinced by the passage of the CTEA
and its subsequent legitimation in Eldred v. Ashcroft .57  The ra-
tionales at work are not identical to those in the period surround-
ing the passage of the first copyright legislation.  While the
concept of the author remains powerful and is reified in much of
copyright law, recourse to its protections is not needed as often
today.  With no memories of the repressive Licensing Act to dis-
suade them, Congress is evermore willing to grant extraordinary
protections to copyright owners without need to disguise the true
beneficiaries.
Yet, they are protections for copyright owners .  The decision to
formulate such protections cannot be surprising given the enor-
mous revenues that pour into the United States from the sale of
copyrighted materials as well as the significant role of intellectual
56 See  Feather, supra  note 30, at 35; see also  Rose, supra  note 41, at 53 (discussing
the aftermath of Donaldson  and the feeling held by some that “a vast amount of
property by contemporary values had been annihilated”).
57 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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property rights in the wealth of a postindustrial society.  The nat-
ural tendency is to conflate the author and ownership of the
work,58 but this inevitably assumes that authors retain the rights
to their work or that they are appropriately compensated for it at
the time of sale.  Neither is necessarily true, but both serve to
disguise the real beneficiaries of the CTEA: the modern
equivalent of publishing houses, institutions such as the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording In-
dustry Association of America (RIAA).59
This does not mean that revenues should not be protected or
that they are not important.  Distributors are vital to maintaining
the marketplace for expression.  Nevertheless, fostering new ex-
pression should not be subordinated to the goal of extracting
every possible dollar out of existing works.  Therefore, concern
for the public domain is essential, as without it new creation, the
intended byproduct of the Copyright Clause, will be reduced.
A. The Passage of the CTEA
The CTEA’s passage was unsurprising to the cynically in-
clined, as without it Disney’s favorite mouse was not long for the
copyrighted world.  However, it was more than simply the prod-
uct of Mickey’s skill in the black arts of legislative influence,
equipped as he is with more lobbyists than magic brooms in Fan-
tasia .  The Act undeniably secured enormous revenues to one of
the United States’ largest export sectors.  Yet, the CTEA pro-
vides an unwelcome glimpse into how distant the discussion
about copyright is from questions of constitutional purpose, as it
focuses almost exclusively on benefits to be derived from existing
copyright, not on the creation of new expression.
The CTEA was not passed to provide further incentives to au-
thors, nor was the rhetoric used to support it overly concerned
with disguising the proprietary interests of copyright holders in
securing greater term duration.  Congress did feel the need to at
least acknowledge the rights of authors and the benefits that the
statute would provide them.  Yet, more than anything else, the
incentive language used seems to be a post hoc nod to embedded
notions of the proper beneficiaries of copyright protection.
While the CTEA illustrates the hold the author retains on our
collective imagination, the CTEA’s significance lies mainly in its
58 See  Jaszi, supra  note 6, at 471-81.
59 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 267-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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granting greater copyright protection while at the same time
paying little attention to constitutional demands.
The House Report accompanying the CTEA offered the fol-
lowing as the purpose behind the Act:
In 1995, the European Union extended the copyright term
for all of its member states from life of the author plus fifty
years to life of the author plus seventy years.  As the world
leader in the export of intellectual property, this has profound
effects for the United States if it does not extend copyright
term as well.
European Union countries, which are huge markets for U.S.
intellectual property, would not have to provide twenty years
of copyright protection to U.S. works and the U.S. would lose
millions of dollars in export revenues. Extending copyright
term to life of the author plus seventy years means that U.S.
works will generally be protected for the same amount of time
as works created by European Union authors.  Therefore, the
United States will ensure that profits generated from the sale
of U.S. intellectual property abroad will come back to the
United States.
Extending copyright protection will be an incentive for U.S.
authors to continue using their creativity to produce works,
and provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to
restore older works and further disseminate them to the pub-
lic.  Authors will be able to pass along to their children and
grandchildren the financial benefits of their works.60
This is the clearest statement of legislative intent available and
is worth parsing carefully.  It begins with a declaration that the
legislation will, as Representative Jackson-Lee observed, “finally
permit us to enjoy the full and appropriate term that European
copyright owners have enjoyed for some time now.”61  Yet, there
60 H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998). By way of comparison, this is part of the
comparable House Report from the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Statute:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. . . . In
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public?  The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms
and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of
the temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. NO. 2222 at 7 (1909).
61 144 CONG. REC. H9949 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee).
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is nothing magical in a seventy-year duration or in the European
Union’s decision to set copyright duration for that period.  More-
over, the language suggests total acceptance of the neoclassicist
model of propertization.  The extra twenty years are character-
ized as securing revenues that U.S. companies would otherwise
“lose,” rather than as an extra tax on the public for works long
paid for and an infringement on the public domain.  Further-
more, the actual value of this incentive is virtually nonexistent to
most authors, as life plus fifty years provides the vast majority of
authors with the effective maximum amount of benefit.62
Nevertheless, the increase in duration to match the European
Union’s level of protection is subsequently offered as the reason
why the CTEA is within the powers granted to strictures of the
Copyright Clause.  Then, the author is evoked, whose ability to
pass down the property rights to her grandchildren will as-
sumedly drive her to greater lengths than if she was merely pass-
ing the rights on to her children under the 1976 Act.63  By linking
increased protection to incentives for authors, the CTEA side-
steps the increasing prevalence of copyrighted works falling
under the category of works-for-hire.64 This category grants the
financial benefits described in the CTEA not to the author’s
grandchildren, but to the grandchildren of the shareholders in
the corporation that owned the copyright from the moment of
creation.65
The avowed purpose of the CTEA is thus largely a nullity,
though the use of the only figure more sympathetic than the
poor, incentive-lacking author—that of the poor, incentive-lack-
ing author with needy grandchildren—is not for naught.  A party
does emerge from the CTEA with a benefit and an incentive:
those who already have copyrighted material worth restoring and
further disseminating.
62 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 254-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63 In fact, the Recording Artist Coalition said exactly this during the consideration
of Eldred . See  Brief of Amici Curiae Recording Artist Coalition, Eldred , 537 U.S.
186 (No. 01-618).  Concern for the children of authors was especially important in
the discussion surrounding the English Copyright Act of 1842. See also  Feather,
supra  note 54.
64 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 267-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 As the prevalence of works-for-hire increases, large corporations (and by ex-
tension their shareholders) own an increasing portion of the most valuable copy-
rights.  For a review of two recent books on the general subject of consolidated
corporate ownership of copyrights, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The First Amendment’s
Biggest Threat , 89 MINN. L. REV. 1798 (2005).
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The passage of the CTEA can be seen as a response to chang-
ing and threatening circumstances.  English booksellers that were
faced with the elimination of their monopoly on the book trade
and fearful of the new business model attempted to skirt the
clear language of the Statute of Anne through judicial recogni-
tion of a natural copyright.  Modern media corporations are simi-
larly threatened, though with a change in social rather than
structural norms.  The generational notion of entertainment or
information as properly acquired for free is a major blow to the
copyrighted industries.  Thus, as distribution becomes less con-
trollable, the focus on the author may in the long run prove to
bite back at the corporations.  If all legitimacy resides in the au-
thor, there is little reason to feel a moral obligation to pay the
distributor.  Yet, however one interprets the CTEA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Eldred  was a disappointing example of the
power of the author to dominate thinking about copyright legis-
lation even when media interests stand to acquire nearly all the
gain.
B. Eldred v. Ashcroft
The CTEA emerges as a wholly unsurprising iteration of the
long line of efforts, both legislative and judicial, to secure greater
copyright duration.  Given its language, there seems little doubt
that further such efforts will occur.  For that reason, the Court’s
decision in Eldred  is vitally important, as it provides a glimpse
into how the Court will respond to those future efforts.
The power of the author to influence the contours of the de-
bate about copyright, as well as the outcome of that debate, is
apparent in the Court’s reasoning in Eldred , the case that tested
the constitutionality of the CTEA and the rhetoric employed by
those who agitated for the decision.  The case was argued on
fairly narrow grounds, and perhaps the Court simply decided that
restraint was the better part of judicial valor when declining to
invalidate the Act.66  Yet, the language and reasoning illuminates
the Court’s thinking about the role of the author in modern cop-
yright law.
The distorting influence of the author first surfaced during the
Court’s analysis of Congress’ authority to increase copyright du-
ration.  In the process of rejecting Justice Stevens’ dissenting ar-
66 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 204-05.
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gument that the limitations on copyright duration serve to
prevent the type of monopoly that plagued England before the
Statute of Anne, the majority asserted that any comparison to
English copyright was totally inapposite because “[t]he Framers
guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in
booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copy-
rights only in ‘Authors.’”67
That phrase tellingly reveals the Court’s conception of copy-
right as centered on the author.  Furthermore, it ignores the pos-
sible accumulation of these freely assignable copyrights.  The
Court failed to account for the changing nature of mass media,
specifically, the consolidated ownership of creative expression in
the hands of a dwindling number of massive corporate entities
with no mandate or reason to be concerned about the market for
expression save their continued profitability.68  Thus, the para-
digm of the author bounded the Court’s conceptualization of the
CTEA’s effects but had little relation to the question before the
Court.
The Court’s analysis was therefore fundamentally flawed from
the beginning, as it assumed that the CTEA was addressed to
furthering incentives for authors.  Instead, the CTEA’s term ex-
tension provided increased revenues almost exclusively to media
corporations, which hold multiple copyrights and can afford to
take the chance that some will prove dear to posterity.  Yet, the
possibility of any single copyrighted work remaining profitable
over fifty years after its author’s death is so tenuous that there is
little chance that authors will see that increased revenue.
The Court then considered whether the CTEA was “a rational
exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright
Clause.”69  Greater understanding of the role that the author
plays in masking the enrichment of media interests to the public
domain’s detriment did not ensue.  The Court began by noting
deferentially that “it is not our role to alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve.”70  Among the factors in that
“delicate balance” were “because Europe has gone that way”71
and “increasing longevity and the trend toward rearing children
67 Id.  at 200 n.5.
68 Id.
69 Id.  at 204.
70 Id.  at 205 n.10 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
71 Id.  at 206 n.11 (quoting Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation
Legislation:  Hearings on H.R. 989 et. al. Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intel-
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later in life.”72
However, when the Court addressed the central constitutional
question of incentives for creation, authors themselves naturally
came to the fore.73  Indeed, when faced with the congressional
testimony of Quincy Jones and Bob Dylan, both of whom sup-
ported the copyright extension, who could easily refuse the re-
quested increase?74  Also testifying about the benefits that would
accrue to the author, and thus to the public, was the Register of
Copyright, who stated that “[a]uthors would not be able to con-
tinue to create . . . unless they earned income on their finished
works.”75  This statement, while on one level a meaningless plati-
tude, takes the logic of the Copyright Clause and uses it to pro-
vide a veneer to an act only glancingly concerned with providing
greater economic security for authors.
These instances indicate not that the registrar or the specific
authors named are complicit or unwitting tools of the media in-
terests, but rather highlight the immense force a specific concep-
tualization of the author can have on the debate about proper
copyright protection.  The statements shift the focus.  Authors
are pushed to the fore and exalted, and the benefit they are to
obtain outweighs considerations of potential harm to the public
interest.  This is a far cry from the Court’s statement in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.  that “[t]he copy-
right law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion.”76  The Eldred  Court only discussed reward.  After noting
that authors are in favor of the extension, the Court did not even
acknowledge that detrimental effects might flow from the legisla-
lectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 230 (1995) (state-
ment of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright)).
72 Id.  at 207 n.14 (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch)).
73 See, e.g. , Brief of Recording Artist Coalition, Eldred , 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-
618).
74 Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on
H.R. 989 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 158 (1995); Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 55-57 (1995).  Perhaps Don Henley (who testified to simi-
lar ends) could be ignored, but certainly not the man who produced “Thriller,” much
less the definitional singer-songwriter of the twentieth century.
75 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 207 n.15 (quoting Copyright Term, Film Labeling and Film
Preservation Legislation:  Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 165
(1995)).
76 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
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tion.  Rather, it moved on to the final argument: whether Con-
gress could simply create perpetual copyright through periodic
extensions to existing copyrights.
Again, the Court was not sympathetic to the petitioner’s
claims, stating that “[n]othing before this Court warrants con-
struction of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension as a congres-
sional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’
constraint.”77  While there may not have been evidence in the
record explicitly stating that this was Congress’ intention—
though some statements like those made by Congresswoman
Bono came close—copyright history from its inception has
evinced media interests’ drive for perpetual copyright.  One need
not be conspiracy-minded to detect a distinct pattern and wonder
when the next advance will be proposed.  Unfortunately, al-
though the majority acknowledged Justice Breyer’s point that the
incentives provided by the extension were virtually nonexistent,
it pithily responded that “[i]t is doubtful . . . that those architects
of our Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription,
thought in terms of the calculator rather than the calendar.”78
Well put, but the Framers also likely thought in terms of decades,
rather than centuries, when considering the meaning of “limited
Times.”
Although the Court avoided the question of incentives for cor-
porate entities, the entities were not so shy.  For example, the
amicus brief of the MPAA offered the testimony of the Register
of Copyright to support the theory that the CTEA provided a
useful incentive and thus was both a benefit to the public as well
as to authors (and, of course, to themselves):
The public benefits not only from an author’s original work
but also from his or her further creations.  Although this tru-
ism may be illustrated in many ways, one of the best examples
is Noah Webster[,] who supported his entire family from the
earnings on his speller and grammar during the twenty years
he took to complete his dictionary.79
The substitution of the corporate entity for the author in this
77 Eldred , 537 U.S. at 209.
78 Id.  at 210 n.16.
79 Brief for Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. in Sup-
port of Respondent at 12, Eldred , 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618) (citing Copyright Term,
Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary ,
104th Cong. 165 (1995)).
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scenario is assumed, to the effect that the movie studios are
placed in a position where the societal value seen to reside in
authors is vested in the studio, thus utilizing the language of au-
thorial incentives to tilt the equation toward their interests.
Furthermore, the MPAA brief noted that “Copyright own-
ers—notably film studios—are unlikely to make the large invest-
ments required to produce derivative works, such as new editions
of old works that include supplemental material such as never-
before-seen outtakes and interviews,” without a copyright dura-
tion sufficient “to assure them of the continued exclusive right to
profit from works building on the underlying work.”80 The exam-
ple used to drive this point home was the release of such “supple-
mental material” connected with Citizen Kane , the prototypical
American auteur  film.81
One might inquire into the MPAA’s understanding of “deriva-
tive works,” but this would be quibbling about actual meaning.
Instead, the important point is the degree to which groups such
as the MPAA were able to advance their own goals by associat-
ing themselves with authors.  The major copyright holders were
the focus of the statute granting them benefits, yet were men-
tioned only in passing in the decision validating that statute.  The
major beneficiaries thus placed themselves in the enviable posi-
tion of benefiting without being saddled with greater expecta-
tions than an occasional special feature on re-released DVDs.
Petitioners also argued that the Copyright Clause contained an
“impediment to the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights”
and “that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech
that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amend-
ment.”82  Neither argument was particularly meritorious, and
neither will likely play a significant role in future litigation over
copyright duration.  And, neither was successful in persuading
the Court to overturn the CTEA.
However, not all Justices accepted the merit of the CTEA.  Al-
though the Court was unswayed by Justice Breyer’s lucid and
cutting dissent, he destroyed the illusion of rationality that the
majority sought to purvey.83  He immediately recognized that the
80 Id.  at 13.
81 Id.  at 14 n.20.
82 Eldred , 537 U.S at 218.
83 Justice Stevens also filed a dissent, though he asserted that Congress could not
extend a copyright past its expiration date. Id.  at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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CTEA’s “primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not
to authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors.”84
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Breyer recognized that with
incremental change in copyright duration, no one time period
will stand out as blatantly unconstitutional, yet the failings of the
CTEA “amount to failings of constitutional kind.”85
Addressing virtually every major failing of the majority opin-
ion, Justice Breyer succinctly described the purpose of copyright
and how it is intended for the benefit of the public, not private
parties.  The reward provided “is a means, not an end,”86 and the
monopoly grant is given only for the benefit received in ex-
change.  However, the extra term of years effectively transfers
“several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copy-
rights—copyrights that, together, already will have earned many
billions of dollars in royalty ‘reward.’”87  He contrasted this
amount flowing to copyright owners with the extra incentives
that authors would receive for the potential value of their cre-
ations.  The incentive is virtually nonexistent.88  Justice Breyer
thus directly addressed all of the major problems with the exten-
sion: little benefit to authors, no benefit to the public, no mean-
ingful incentives for creation, most of the reward flows to
corporate copyright owners, and a diminished public domain.
Yet the majority was not persuaded.  Instead, by casting the
discussion in terms of the author’s perception of incentives, the
Court, consciously or unconsciously, shifted the argument into
one of measuring the immeasurable, a perfect way to allow it to
withdraw behind the veil of rational basis review.89  Moreover,
the Court’s logic implies that the key question is whether an au-
thor thinks that she is receiving more incentive, not whether she
actually is receiving more.90
CONCLUSION
The comparison between early copyright law and the CTEA
and Eldred  indicates that the issues confronting those who are
charged with developing copyright regimes remain largely un-
84 Id.  at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85 Id.
86 Id.  at 245.
87 Id.  at 249.
88 Id.  254-57.
89 Id.  at 204-05 (majority opinion).
90 Id.  at 207 n.15.
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changed from those that existed three centuries ago.  The prob-
lem therefore becomes not that Congress or the Court have
deliberately ignored the incentive structure laid out by the Con-
stitution.  Rather, what emerges is that the CTEA and Eldred
have both been the product of media interest pressure and the
ability of the author to serve as a vessel in which the interests of
unsympathetic and undeserving parties may be carried.  The
challenge for the future is to continue the project of analyzing the
author’s role in legitimating copyright law and addressing the de-
gree to which the social construct provides a heuristic for inter-
preting the copyright regime.  If and when the Court is called
upon to determine the constitutionality of future attempts to in-
crease the copyright term, only such awareness and highlighting
of the author’s role in diverting attention away from the primacy
of the public’s interest will ensure that the dream of perpetual
copyright remains just that.
